天美传媒

Date Posted:Wed, 20 Sep 2023 13:59:46 -0500
Growing interest in the role of business entities in addressing social problems highlights the potential of social enterprises?organizations that cover all or most of their costs through revenue-generating business and have an objective to address a societal problem. A social enterprise can be an efficient and effective way to create social value by internalizing externalities, exploiting complementarities with commercial activities, providing better prices or quality to disadvantaged customers, and reducing the need for scarce philanthropic support. The challenges of managing an organization for financial success and social impact may limit their potential. Social enterprises can be for-profit or nonprofit organizations. The legal and institutional structure of for-profit and nonprofit governance and financing makes it challenging for a social entrepreneur to find a business model and organization structure to succeed.

Date Posted:Sat, 22 Oct 2011 07:15:45 -0500
Large companies are usually organized into business units, yet some activities are almost always centralized in a company-wide functional unit. We first show that organizations endogenously create an incentive conflict between functional managers (who desire excessive standardization) and business-unit managers (who desire excessive local adaptation). We then study how the allocation of authority and tasks to functional and business-unit managers interacts with this endogenous incentive ...

Date Posted:Sat, 22 Oct 2011 00:00:00 -0500
Large companies are usually organized into business units, yet some activities are almost always centralized in a company-wide functional unit. We first show that organizations endogenously create an incentive conflict between functional managers (who desire excessive standardization) and business-unit managers (who desire excessive local adaptation). We then study how the allocation of authority and tasks to functional and business-unit managers interacts with this endogenous incentive conflict. Our analysis generates testable implications for the likely success of mergers and for the organizational structure and incentives inside multidivisional firms.

Date Posted:Tue, 27 Jul 2010 09:37:45 -0500
This paper presents a framework for analyzing the costs and benefits of internal vs. external capital allocation. We focus primarily on comparing an internal capital market to bank lending. While both represent centralized forms of financing, in the former case the financing is owner-provided, while in the latter case it is not. We argue that the ownership aspect of internal capital allocation has three important consequences: 1) it leads to more monitoring than bank lending; 2) it reduces managers' entrepreneurial incentives; and 3) it makes it easier to efficiently redeploy the assets of projects that are performing poorly under existing management.

Date Posted:Tue, 22 Apr 2008 04:03:16 -0500
This paper compares board and director characteristics of reverse leveraged buyout (LBO) firms controlled by LBO specialists to those of an industry- and size-matched comparison sample. We consider the boards of the reverse LBOs to be value-maximizing because of the strong incentives the LBO specialists have to structure those boards in a way that maximizes shareholder value. Relative to the comparison firms, we find that the boards of the reverse LBOs are smaller, control larger equity ...

Date Posted:Tue, 22 Apr 2008 03:42:46 -0500
This paper compares board and director characteristics of reverse leveraged buyout (LBO) firms controlled by LBO specialists to those of an industry- and size-matched comparison sample. We consider the boards of the reverse LBOs to be value-maximizing because of the strong incentives the LBO specialists have to structure those boards in a way that maximizes shareholder value. Relative to the comparison firms, we find that the boards of the reverse LBOs are smaller, control larger equity ...

Date Posted:Tue, 07 Aug 2007 05:47:21 -0500
No abstract is available for this paper.

Date Posted:Tue, 07 Aug 2007 00:00:00 -0500
Aggregate cost uncertainty, arising from real shocks or unanticipated inflation, reduces the informativeness of prices by scrambling relative and aggregate variations. But when agents can acquire additional information, such increased noise may in fact lead them to become better informed, and price competition will intensify. We examine these issues in a model of search with learning, where consumers search optimally from an unknown price distribution while firms price optimally given consumers' search rules. We show that the decisive factor in whether inflation variability increases or reduces the incentive to search, and thereby market efficiency, is the size of informational costs.

Date Posted:Tue, 08 May 2007 00:00:00 -0500
Multi-product firms create value by integrating functional activities such as manufacturing across business units. This integration often requires making functional managers responsible for implementing standardization, thereby limiting business-unit managers' authority. Realizing synergies then involves a tradeoff between motivation and coordination. Motivating managers requires narrowly-focused incentives around their area of responsibility. Functional managers become biased toward excessive standardization and business-unit managers may misrepresent local market information to limit standardization. As a result, integration may be value-destroying when motivation is sufficiently important. Providing functional managers only with "dotted-line control" (where business-unit managers can block standardization) has limited ability to improve the tradeoff.

Date Posted:Mon, 07 May 2007 19:29:29 -0500
Multi-product firms create value by integrating functional activities such as manufacturing across business units. This integration often requires making functional managers responsible for implementing standardization, thereby limiting business-unit managers' authority. Realizing synergies then involves a tradeoff between motivation and coordination. Motivating managers requires narrowly-focused incentives around their area of responsibility. Functional managers become biased toward excessive ...

Date Posted:Tue, 02 Jan 2007 23:31:37 -0600
We present a model of a financially distressed firm with outstanding bank debt and public debt. Coordination problems among public debtholders introduce investment inefficiencies in the workout process. In most cases, these inefficiencies are not mitigated by the ability of firms to buy back their public debt with cash and other securities--the only feasible way that firms can restructure their public debt. We show that Chapter 11 reorganization law increases investment and we characterize the ...

Date Posted:Thu, 28 Dec 2006 00:00:00 -0600
We present a model of a financially distressed firm with outstanding bank debt and public debt. Coordination problems among public debtholders introduce investment inefficiencies in the workout process. In most cases, these inefficiencies are not mitigated by the ability of firms to buy back their public debt with cash and other securities--the only feasible way that firms can restructure their public debt. We show that Chapter 11 reorganization law increases investment and we characterize the types of corporate financial structures for which this increased investment enhances efficiency.

Date Posted:Mon, 01 Sep 2003 05:02:34 -0500
We examine the investment behavior of firms before and after being spun off from their parent companies. Their investment after the spin-off is significantly more sensitive to measures of investment opportunities (e.g., industry Tobin's Q or industry investment) than it is before the spin-off. Spin-offs tend to cut investment in low Q industries and increase investment in high Q industries. These changes are observed primarily in spin-offs of firms in industries unrelated to the parents' ...

Date Posted:Wed, 27 Aug 2003 21:47:37 -0500
We examine the investment behavior of firms before and after being spun off from their parent companies. Their investment after the spin-off is significantly more sensitive to measures of investment opportunities (e.g., industry Tobin's Q or industry investment) than it is before the spin-off. Spin-offs tend to cut investment in low Q industries and increase investment in high Q industries. These changes are observed primarily in spin-offs of firms in industries unrelated to the parents' industries and in spin-offs where the stock market reacts favorably to the spin-off announcement. Our findings suggest that spin-offs may improve the allocation of capital.

Date Posted:Fri, 21 Jun 2002 06:08:57 -0500
Economic growth depends in large part on technological change. Laws governing intellectual property rights protect inventors from competition in order to create incentives for them to innovate. Antitrust laws constrain how a monopolist can act in order to maintain its monopoly in an attempt to foster competition. There is a fundamental tension between these two different types of laws. Attempts to adapt static antitrust analysis to a setting of dynamic R&D competition through the use of ...

Date Posted:Fri, 07 Jun 2002 20:47:28 -0500
Economic growth depends in large part on technological change. Laws governing intellectual property rights protect inventors from competition in order to create incentives for them to innovate. Antitrust laws constrain how a monopolist can act in order to maintain its monopoly in an attempt to foster competition. There is a fundamental tension between these two different types of laws. Attempts to adapt static antitrust analysis to a setting of dynamic R&D competition through the use of 'innovation markets' are likely to lead to error. Applying standard antitrust doctrines such as tying and exclusivity to R&D settings is likely to be complicated. Only detailed study of the industry of concern has the possibility of uncovering reliable relationships between innovation and industry behavior. One important form of competition, especially in certain network industries, is between open and closed systems. We have presented an example to illustrate how there is a tendency for systems to close even though an open system is socially more desirable. Rather than trying to use the antitrust laws to attack the maintenance of closed systems, an alternative approach would be to use intellectual property laws and regulations to promote open systems and the standard setting organizations that they require. Recognition that optimal policy toward R&D requires coordination between the antitrust and intellectual property laws is needed.

Date Posted:Thu, 03 Jan 2002 06:15:58 -0600
This paper examines the events following the onset of financial distress for 102 public junk bond issuers. We find that out-of-court debt relief mainly comes from junk bond holders; banks almost never forgive principal, though they do defer payments and waive debt covenants. Asset sales are an important means of avoiding Chapter 11 reorganization; however, they may be limited by industry factors. If a company simply restructures its bank debt, but either does not restructure its public debt ...

Date Posted:Mon, 05 Nov 2001 11:26:59 -0600
This paper examines the investment behavior of firms before and after they are spun off from their parent companies. We show that investment after the spinoff is significantly more sensitive to measures of investment opportunities (e.g. industry Tobin's Q or industry investment) than it is before the spinoff. Spinoffs tend to cut their investment in low Q industries and increase their investment in high Q industries. These changes are observed only in spinoffs of firms in industries unrelated ...

Date Posted:Fri, 26 Jan 2001 11:48:26 -0600
This paper examines the investment behavior of firms before and after they are spun off from their parent companies. We show that investment after the spinoff is significantly more sensitive to measures of investment opportunities (e.g. industry Tobin's Q or industry investment) than it is before the spinoff. Spinoffs tend to cut their investment in low Q industries and increase their investment in high Q industries. These changes are observed only in spinoffs of firms in industries unrelated to the parents' industries and in spinoffs where the stock market reacts favorably to the spinoff announcement. Our findings point to the possibility that one effect of spinoffs is to improve the allocation of capital.

Date Posted:Thu, 27 Apr 2000 00:00:00 -0500
This paper examines the events following the onset of financial distress for 102 public junk bond issuers. We find that out-of-court debt relief mainly comes from junk bond - holders; banks almost never forgive principal, though they do defer payments and waive debt covenants. Asset sales are an important means of avoiding Chapter 11 reorganization; however, they may be limited by industry factors. If a company simply restructures its bank debt, but either does not restructure its public debt or does not sell major assets or merge, the company goes bankrupt. The structure of a company's liabilities affects the likelihood that it goes bankrupt; companies whose bank and private debt are secured as well as companies with complex public debt structures are more prone to go bankrupt. Finally, there is no evidence that more profitable distressed companies are more successful in dealing with financial distress; they are not less likely to go bankrupt, sell assets, or reduce capital expenditures.

Date Posted:Sun, 20 Sep 1998 00:00:00 -0500
This paper compares board and director characteristics of reverse leveraged buyout (LBO) firms controlled by LBO specialists to those of an industry- and size-matched comparison sample. We consider the boards of the reverse LBOs to be value-maximizing because of the strong incentives the LBO specialists have to structure those boards in a way that maximizes shareholder value. Relative to the comparison firms, we find that the boards of the reverse LBOs are smaller, control larger equity stakes, and meet less frequently. Relative to directors of the comparison firms, directors of the reverse LBOs are younger, have shorter tenures, are less likely to be women, and are at least as likely to serve on other boards.

Date Posted:Mon, 09 Jun 1997 00:00:00 -0500
This paper compares board and director characteristics of reverse leveraged buyout (LBO) firms controlled by LBO specialists to those of an industry- and size-matched comparison sample. We consider the boards of the reverse LBOs to be value-maximizing because of the strong incentives the LBO specialists have to structure those boards in a way that maximizes shareholder value. Relative to the comparison firms, we find that the boards of the reverse LBOs are smaller, control larger equity stakes, and meet less frequently. Relative to directors of the comparison firms, directors of the reverse LBOs are younger, have shorter tenures, are less likely to be women, and are at least as likely to serve on other boards.